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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

2

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
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:
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:

7

UNITED STATES.

8

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
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No. 08-108

:

Washington, D.C.

10

Wednesday, February 25, 2009
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The above-entitled matter came on for oral

13

argument before the Supreme Court of the United States

14

at 11:12 a.m.
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16
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(11:12 a.m.)

3

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:

We will hear

4

argument next in Case 08-108, Flores-Figueroa v. United

5

States.

6

Mr. Russell.

7

ORAL ARGUMENT OF KEVIN K. RUSSELL

8

ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

9
10

MR. RUSSELL:

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it

please the Court:

11

In common usage, to say that somebody

12

knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses something is to

13

say that that person knows what it is that he is

14

transferring, possessing, or using.

15

knowingly used a pair of scissors of his mother, I am

16

saying not simply that John knew that he was using

17

something which turned out to be his mother's scissors

18

or even that John knew he was using scissors which

19

turned out to be his mother's, I am saying that John

20

knew that the scissors he was using belonged to his

21

mother.

22

If I say that John

The same principle follows under the Federal

23

aggravated identity theft statute, which calls for a

24

two-year mandatory sentence for anyone who, during and

25

in relation certain predicate offenses 3
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1

JUSTICE ALITO:

Doesn't that depend on the

2

context?

You could think of examples where you have

3

exactly the same usage and the person wouldn't

4

necessarily know about the ownership of the thing in

5

question?

6

MR. RUSSELL:

7

of one.

8

one.

The government hasn't been able to come up with

9
10

I haven't been able to think

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:

Well, how about so

and so stole the car that belonged to Mr. Jones?

11

MR. RUSSELL:

I think -

12

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:

I suppose you could

13

say that -- that the person knew it was Mr. Jones's car,

14

but more likely somebody stole the car that turned out

15

to be Mr. Jones's.

16

MR. RUSSELL:

I do think that that

17

formulation gives rise to a little bit more ambiguity in

18

that context.

19

car of Mr. Jones," it's -- it's not particularly

20

ambiguous.

21

that I think -

22

I think, though, if you said "stole the

At the very least, this is a formulation

JUSTICE SCALIA:

He says he knowingly stole

23

the car that belonged to Mr. Jones.

24

the parallel?

25

MR. RUSSELL:

Wouldn't that be

Yes, I'm sorry if I left that
4
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1

part out.

2
3

JUSTICE SCALIA:
"knowingly."

4

MR. RUSSELL:

5

JUSTICE SCALIA:

6

You left out the

Yes.
Once you put in

"knowingly" -

7

MR. RUSSELL:

I think if the statement is,

8

you know, John knowingly stole the car of Mr. Jones,

9

that strongly implies that John knew that the car

10

belonged to Mr. Jones.

11

JUSTICE ALITO:

I repeat, doesn't that

12

depend on the context?

13

you know a car was stolen from our street last night?

14

Oh, what car was stolen?

15

Jones.

16

doesn't necessarily mean that the person who stole the

17

car knew that it was Mr. Jones's car.

18

You say -- somebody says to you,

Oh, it was the car of Mr.

He knowingly stole the car of Mr. Jones.

MR. RUSSELL:

It

I do think that the

19

formulation that John knowingly stole the car of Mr.

20

Jones most naturally is understood to imply that John

21

knew whose car it was he was stealing.

22

We don't claim that the government's

23

interpretation is grammatically impossible.

24

simply saying that, by far the most common usage of this

25

kind of formulation, particularly in a criminal statute,
5
Alderson Reporting Company
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1

is that the knowledge element applies to the -

2

JUSTICE ALITO:

Who did the mugger mug?

He

3

mugged the man from Denver.

You think that he knowingly

4

mugged the man from Denver.

You think that means that

5

the mugger knew that the man was from Denver?

6
7

MR. RUSSELL:
ambiguous statement.

8

JUSTICE ALITO:

9

MR. RUSSELL:

10

Why is it more ambiguous?
Because I think the "from"

preposition -

11
12

I think that that's a more

JUSTICE ALITO:

Why is it less unambiguous?

I thought your argument was that this was unambiguous.

13

MR. RUSSELL:

I think the possessive form

14

makes it, through common usage, unambiguous.

15

claim that it's grammatically impossible.

16

think that in ordinary usage people would understand

17

that -

18

JUSTICE BREYER:

We don't

But we do

Well, so what if it isn't?

19

I mean, suppose you had a statute, and the statute says

20

it is a crime to mug a man from Denver.

21

ordinance, by the way -

22

(Laughter.)

23

JUSTICE BREYER:

That's a Denver

-- because no one else

24

would pass it.

But I mean, if those are the elements of

25

the crime, I guess, we do normally apply "knowingly" to
6
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1

each of them.

2
3

MR. RUSSELL:

JUSTICE BREYER:

Whether -- even if it isn't

ordinary usage.

6

MR. RUSSELL:

7

than one argument.

8

ordinary usage -

9
10

In

the criminal -

4
5

That -- that is correct.

That's right.

We have more

We think that as a matter of

JUSTICE BREYER:

I was slightly trying to

push you on to the next argument.

11

(Laughter.)

12

MR. RUSSELL:

Well, we do think that, in a

13

criminal statute, you ordinarily assume -- this Court

14

has said that a conventional mens rea element extends to

15

all of the elements of the offense.

16

And Congress knows how to deviate from that

17

when it wants to.

18

statute that the Court construed in the X-Citement Video

19

case, where it referred to a person "knowingly"

20

transporting a visual depiction, comma, "if" that visual

21

depiction had certain characteristics.

22

recognized that that kind of formulation most naturally

23

is read to end the knowledge requirement at the "comma,

24

if."

25

It did so, for example, in the

And this Court

Congress didn't do that here.
7
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1

there is no textual indication that would lead one to

2

believe that the -- it intended anything other than a

3

completely conventional mens rea requirement in this

4

case.

5

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

Mr. Russell, am I correct

6

in understanding that the government goes with you

7

almost all the way, and its only the last three words,

8

"of another person," that -- they agree "knowingly"

9

applies to "without lawful authority" and that it

10

applies to "a means of identification"?

11

know that it what you're using is a means of

12

identification.

13

MR. RUSSELL:

You have to

As I understand it, that is

14

not their position.

15

position.

16

the verbs, and then they say, well, if you don't accept

17

that, well, maybe it goes through "without lawful

18

authority."

19

then it goes halfway through the phrase "means of

20

identification of another person."

21

That's the back-up to their back-up

The first position is that it only applies to

And if you don't accept that, then maybe

So, they do raise all three alternatives.

22

That last argument, I think, fails both for text -

23

common usage reasons and in light of this tradition that

24

we've been discussing.

25

textual cue that the knowledge requirement stops halfway

Textually, there is simply no

8
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1

through the direct-object phrase, "means of

2

identification of another person."

3

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

Is the first -- this

4

alien's first effort to get papers that would qualify

5

for him, if I -- if I remember correctly, the first time

6

around he used an assumed name, not his own name.

7

MR. RUSSELL:

8

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

9
10

birth.

That's correct.
He used a false date of

He got a Social Security card that happened to

belong -- to be the number of no live person.

11

MR. RUSSELL:

12

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

13

have violated.

14

would not have violated -

Correct.
And -- and that would not

Even in the government's reading, that

15

MR. RUSSELL:

That's right.

16

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

17

But the second time around, your case, he

-- this statute.

18

did use his own name.

And the question was -- and it

19

turned out that both the Social Security card and the

20

alien registration, they were two different people, but

21

they were both alive.

22

MR. RUSSELL:

Correct.

23

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

So that does make it a

24

crime.

But when the number turned out to be -- not

25

belong to anybody, then it's not -- you don't get the
9
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1

two-year add-on?

2

MR. RUSSELL:

Just to be clear, the only

3

reason the government alleges that there is a crime here

4

is because it turned out that those numbers had been

5

assigned to somebody else.

6

enough.

7

predicate offenses, and he received very substantial

8

punishment for that, but it's not enough to show that he

9

was qualified for an additional two years' mandatory

10

Under our view, that's not

That's enough to show that he committed the

sentence as an aggravated identity thief.

11

Now, you can -

12

JUSTICE ALITO:

What would happen if the -

13

the defendant doesn't -- doesn't act knowingly as to the

14

question whether the identifying information belongs to

15

a real person but is simply reckless as to whether the

16

identifying information belongs to a real person?

17

Suppose that someone buys an identification card and

18

looks at it, and it looks like it might be a real

19

identification card on which that person's picture has

20

been inserted in place of the real picture, but the

21

person can't be sure.

22

fake card.

23

It might really be an entirely

Would that be a violation?
MR. RUSSELL:

Ordinarily, recklessness

24

doesn't satisfy a knowledge requirement.

25

blindness ordinarily does.

Willful

But recklessness in itself
10
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1
2
3
4

ordinarily does not.
JUSTICE KENNEDY:

Would it be enough to go

to the jury on the hypothetical Justice Alito gives you?
MR. RUSSELL:

I think so.

The government is

5

free to present circumstantial evidence.

6

JUSTICE KENNEDY:

You agree that you could

7

go to the jury whenever there is an identity card that

8

does reflect the identity of a real person but there's

9

no other knowledge that the government's case has

10

introduced that shows -- there's no other evidence that

11

the government has introduced showing knowledge?

12

MR. RUSSELL:

If there's -- I think that

13

could be a component of a circumstantial evidence case.

14

I don't think it would be enough, particularly in a case

15

like this, where -

16

JUSTICE KENNEDY:

Suppose I had five

17

different cards with five different real people.

18

that be enough to go?

19

MR. RUSSELL:

Would

I don't think so in itself.

20

Precisely -- particularly in a case like this, where the

21

person gets up and testifies that they didn't know.

22

fact that there's these numbers here -

23

JUSTICE KENNEDY:

No, no.

No. The fact that

24

he testifies -- that doesn't have anything to do with

25

whether or not the case would go to the jury.
11
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1

government make its case sufficient to resist a

2

motion -- a directed motion for acquittal if it just

3

puts in the fact that you have five identity cards and

4

there are five different people that are all real

5

people?

6

MR. RUSSELL:

No, I don't think so.

And in

7

fact, the fact that there are five different people

8

probably tends to undermine the evidence.

9
10

JUSTICE SCALIA:

You are making it very hard

for me to vote with you, I must say.

11

(Laughter.)

12

MR. RUSSELL:

13

JUSTICE SCALIA:

I -

Well I thought you had a pretty

14

good -- a pretty good case, but if you are going to say

15

somebody who has five identity cards, faces of

16

individuals -- I mean, presumably they are real

17

individuals.

18

MR. RUSSELL:

19

misunderstanding the hypothetical -

20

I'm sorry.

JUSTICE SCALIA:

I may be

That was -- that was the

21

hypothetical.

22

identity cards of real people, and -- and you don't know

23

that he knows that it's the identity card of a real

24

person, but he used it.

25

Five different -- a person has five

MR. RUSSELL:

Okay.

If they -- these are

12
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1

identity cards that have the picture of somebody other

2

than him on them -

3

JUSTICE SCALIA:

4

MR. RUSSELL:

5

Yes.

-- which is an unusual

thing -

6

JUSTICE SCALIA:

7

MR. RUSSELL:

Of course.

-- to try to use, but if

8

that's the case, then, yes, I think that -- you know,

9

that if there would be -- affirms that that picture

10

belongs to the person whose number is there, then they

11

could do that.

12
13

The ordinary -

JUSTICE KENNEDY:

No, no.

You have to have

the further inference that he knows that.

14

MR. RUSSELL:

I think that a jury could

15

reasonably infer that the person wouldn't -- would not,

16

that if you have an ID card with somebody else's name,

17

somebody else's number, somebody else's picture, that

18

that belongs to somebody else.

19

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

That's not -- that's not

20

this case.

21

don't know whether there was a picture on the alien

22

registration card.

23

own name.

24
25

In this case, he had his own name.

And I

I don't know if he -- he used his

Did he use his own photograph?
MR. RUSSELL:

that question.

I don't know the answer to

I mean, Social Security cards don't have
13
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1

pictures.

2

JUSTICE KENNEDY:

That was going to be my

3

next question.

4

the Petitioner's own name but somebody else's number.

5
6

So the next question is, suppose it's

MR. RUSSELL:
that's not sufficient.

I would tend to think that
Of course -

7

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

8

JUSTICE KENNEDY:

9
10

Well, that Even if he had five

different cards, all with his name, but all with the
identification numbers of other real people?

11

MR. RUSSELL:

Again, I would think not.

I

12

can understand that people could disagree with that.

13

And, of course, the government is free to raise those

14

kinds of arguments in other cases where this comes up.

15

All of this goes the question of what does

16

it take to show that somebody knows something.

17

question before the Court right now, and the only

18

question, is whether the government has to show that

19

knowledge at all.

20

government's principal argument, I think, their

21

strongest argument, is that reducing the mens rea

22

requirement in that way serves the purpose of

23

facilitating prosecutions and therefore protection of

24

victims.

25

The

And in this case, you know, the

And we don't deny that it has that effect.
14
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1

And we don't deny that this statute is directed at

2

protecting victims, but that could be said of an awful

3

lot of criminal statutes.

4

JUSTICE ALITO:

What if the defendant

5

chooses a name -- uses a name other than his or her own

6

name -- gets an identification card made up with that -

7

and doesn't know for sure that the name that's chosen

8

actually belongs to another person, but because it's not

9

an extremely uncommon name, has -- knows that it's

10

virtually certain that that name belongs to some other

11

person who is unknown to him?

12

MR. RUSSELL:

13

JUSTICE ALITO:

14

MR. RUSSELL:

I think Is that a violation?
Again, you have this issue of

15

recklessness versus knowledge.

16

it belonged to -- if he used John Doe -- and, in fact,

17

it turns out there are several hundred John Doe's in

18

this country, and it does raise a difficult question

19

about how this statute ought to apply when you are using

20

something that is so commonly identifying somebody, but

21

it's hard to say that it's identifying anybody in

22

particular.

23

If he knew that in fact

The definition of "means of identification"

24

in the statute says it has to be a name or number that

25

is capable of identifying a specific person.
15
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1

think you get into questions, when you're talking about

2

common names, about how the statute -- whether the

3

statute would be satisfied in that respect.

4

JUSTICE ALITO:

Well, what if it's not an

5

extremely common name, but not an extremely uncommon

6

name?

7

Kevin K. Russell?

8
9
10

Would that be a violation?

MR. RUSSELL:

You would have to show that he

knew that that was a name belonging to a specific
person.

11
12

And what if it's -- what if the defendant chooses

JUSTICE ALITO:

He had -- he would have to

know that there is such a person?

13

MR. RUSSELL:

He would have to know that

14

there is such -- he wouldn't have to know me, but he

15

would have to know that there is such a person.

16

again -

But

17

JUSTICE KENNEDY:

18

that -- but suppose he uses John Smith.

19

that -- do you have to show that he knows there is a

20

John Smith in the phone book, someplace in the United

21

States?

22

MR. RUSSELL:

Does he have to know it's

I think so.

Does it suffice

I don't think

23

he'd have to know who that John Smith was, but he'd have

24

to know there is a John Smith.

25

kind of scenario does raise difficult questions about -

And that -- I mean, that

16
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1
2

JUSTICE KENNEDY:

But I want an answer to

the question.

3

MR. RUSSELL:

Well, I think the answer is

4

the one that I gave you, which I think is disputable,

5

but it's -- the answer is yes, he has to know that there

6

is a specific person named John Smith.

7

JUSTICE KENNEDY:

And it can't be submitted

8

to the jury on the ground that anybody knows there's a

9

John Smith?

10

MR. RUSSELL:

I think -

11

JUSTICE KENNEDY:

Can -- can it go to the

12

jury without any other evidence, other than the fact of

13

his possessing the card?

14

MR. RUSSELL:

If it's a sufficiently common

15

name that he ought to know that there is somebody

16

bearing that name, then yes, I would agree that it could

17

go to the jury on that.

18

JUSTICE SOUTER:

If the name were Anthony

19

Kennedy, would that go to the jury?

20

(Laughter.)

21

MR. RUSSELL:

I -- again -- it's hard to

22

draw lines here, but I think the ultimate question is,

23

you know, could a reasonable jury think that somebody

24

using that name has to know that there is a person with

25

that name, a specific person with that name?
17
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1

possibly they could.

2
3

JUSTICE SOUTER:

Can you give me an example?

It go to the jury, wouldn't it?

4

MR. RUSSELL:

An awful lot of name examples

5

would.

I think simply in this case, though, when you

6

are talking about a number -- I don't think -- it's a

7

much harder case to say that simply having a number on a

8

card should -- should lead you to know that that name

9

very likely belongs to somebody else.

In fact, there

10

are nine -- there are -- there a billion possible

11

combinations for security -- Social Security numbers,

12

and only about 400 million have been issued.

13

back -- I -

14

JUSTICE KENNEDY:

But to get

But if you say this goes

15

to the jury, it doesn't leave very much to your

16

knowledge argument.

17

MR. RUSSELL:

Well -

18

JUSTICE KENNEDY:

I mean, I suppose that

19

defense counsel could get up and say, the government

20

hasn't shown that he knew this.

And then the government

21

says, of course, he knows this.

I don't think you have

22

accomplished very much.

23

MR. RUSSELL:

Well, it -- I think the jury

24

still has to make the finding that he knew it.

25

case like this, where my client testified that he didn't
18
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1

know it, where the government didn't contest that,

2

didn't argue that there were circumstantial evidence

3

showing that he did know it, it's going to be

4

outcome-determinative.

5

In that -

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

How do these operations

6

work?

7

identification papers, did the first time -- did he go

8

to the same outfit as the time he used a false name?

9
10

When he went to Chicago to buy false

MR. RUSSELL:

The record doesn't disclose

that, and I don't know.

11

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

12

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:

13

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

14

These are Can I -

These are outfits that

specialize in making false identifications?

15

MR. RUSSELL:

Again, the record doesn't

16

disclose how sophisticated the operation was.

17

case, it could just be, you know, a guy who does this;

18

it could be a very sophisticated operation.

19

it's kind of all over the place out there, in the real

20

world.

21

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

In this

I think

Do you have any sense

22

of -- because there are many people with false

23

identification papers -- how many times it turns out to

24

be the number of a live person, and how many times it

25

turns out like it was in the first instance in this
19
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1

case:

It's just a number, a made-up number that doesn't

2

belong to anybody?

3
4

MR. RUSSELL:

I'm afraid I don't have a good

sense of that.

5

But just to be clear, in addition to being

6

able to just say on the face of the fact about the

7

identification that the government can present

8

circumstantial evidence to the jury, in a great number

9

of cases, particularly the kinds that Congress was most

10

concerned about, the way that they -- the defendant

11

obtained the identification and the way that they used

12

it provides powerful circumstantial evidence of

13

knowledge.

14

Somebody who breaks into a computer system

15

or unauthorizedly uses access to a computer system or

16

goes dumpster diving looking for IDs obviously knows

17

that they are going to end up with an ID that belongs to

18

another person.

19

into a real person's bank account, then it's awfully

20

good information that they were aware that that was an

21

ID that belonged to another person, because there's no

22

sense in trying to break into the bank account of a

23

nonexistent person.

24
25

And if they use the ID to try to get

And so we don't think that this is a case in
which the government faces some kind of insurmountable
20
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1

burden in proving knowledge in a way that's particularly

2

different than -- than other kinds of situations in

3

which the law commonly requires the government to prove

4

what a defendant knew or didn't know.

5

To get back to the victim-focused nature of

6

this, you know, Congress could -- we don't dispute that

7

Congress could make a policy judgment that it would be

8

good to hold defendants strictly liable when they used

9

an identification that turns out to belong to somebody

10

else.

11

respect to sentencing enhancement provisions of the sort

12

that the government points to with respect to drug

13

quantity or selling drugs in a school zone.

14

Sometimes the law does that, most commonly with

But when Congress makes that choice,

15

Congress makes that clear in the text of the statute.

16

And so if you look at the drug quantity or the school

17

zone provisions, which are in appendix E and D of the -

18

of the yellow brief appendix, in appendix D you see that

19

Congress establishes in subsection (a) of that provision

20

the "unlawful act," and it says it's unlawful for any

21

person "knowingly to manufacture, distribute," et

22

cetera, a controlled substance.

23

It includes in that provision a knowledge

24

requirement, which, by the way, nobody thinks means only

25

that the government has to show that they knowingly
21
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manufactured something which turned out to be a

2

controlled substance.

3

knowledge requirement in that position extends to the

4

direct object phrase, "controlled substance."

5

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:

6

that doesn't help you much because it can't be

7

"knowingly manufacture" something is the crime.

8

you do have to go on to have that make any sense.

9

don't have to go on to make your provision make any

10

sense, that he knowingly, you know, uses a means of

11

identification.

12

Everybody agrees that the

MR. RUSSELL:

Well, but that's -

I mean,
You

I disagree as matter of common

13

usage.

14

statute read that way or writes a statute that looks

15

like this one, which in subsection (b) lays out the

16

facts that are aggravating, that they are going to

17

punish separately, the drug quantity in subsection (b)

18

of 21 U.S.C. 841 -

19

But I think when Congress intends to have a

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:

No, I -- I guess

20

maybe this was what I was trying to say earlier as well.

21

I mean, you have in your statute, in between there, the

22

modifier "without lawful authority."

23

MR. RUSSELL:

24

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:

25

That's right.
So that means that

it can stop at a lot more number of earlier places than
22
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can the statute that you were just citing in appendix D.

2

MR. RUSSELL:

Well, to answer that question

3

-- and then I'd like to return to the school zone

4

example -- the fact that Congress put in "without lawful

5

authority" and enclosed it with commas I think simply

6

reflects that Congress understood that, by inserting

7

that phrase between transitive verbs and the direct

8

object, it was interrupting the natural flow of the

9

sentence.

And I don't think it means -- so the first

10

comma may tell the reader to pause, but the second comma

11

I think just as clearly indicates to the reader that the

12

flow of the sentence continues.

13

And so that I don't think you would say a

14

sentence that says, John knowingly used without

15

permission a pair of scissors of his mother's.

16

would still read that to mean that John knew that the

17

scissors he was using belonged to his mother.

18

insertion of the parenthetical, I think, indicates that

19

Congress knew it could put it at the end and not change

20

the meaning or put it here.

21

You

That the

But when Congress intends to write a statute

22

that -- that holds people strictly liable for

23

aggravating circumstances or writes something like the

24

federal quantity provisions where, in subsection (b),

25

Congress sets out the punishment that is deserving
23
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because of that aggravating factor, and it does not

2

include a mens rea requirement in subsection (b).

3

And in the school zone provision, Congress

4

likewise has no mens rea requirement with respect to the

5

knowledge of the person being in a school zone.

6

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

What about the

7

government's argument in this case that Congress was

8

really going after people who have false identifications

9

because of its concern to protect the victim, that is,

10

the person whose number is misused?

11

is urging that we take a victim-centered approach to the

12

statute.

13

MR. RUSSELL:

So the government

I do think it's a fair point,

14

that this is a statute that's concerned with victims.

15

Lots of criminal statutes are.

16

read it -- Congress doesn't ordinarily enact even

17

victim-focused statutes without mens rea requirements,

18

and courts don't ordinarily narrowly construe them, even

19

though it's true that omitting mens rea requirements or

20

narrowly construing them furthers the purpose of

21

protecting victims.

22

commonly, as the LaFave treatise that we cite to you

23

explains, we don't hold defendants criminally strictly

24

liable for all of the consequences of their crimes.

25

gives the example of somebody who breaks into a house

But we don't ordinarily

In fact, by far more -- far more

24
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intending to rob it and accidentally sets it on fire -

2

you know, they're engaged in unlawful conduct to start

3

with and so they're not fully blameless, but nonetheless

4

we don't hold them criminally liable for arson because

5

they didn't intend it.

6

Now, Congress could make a choice.

Congress

7

could choose to hold that arsonist strictly liable -- or

8

the robbery suspect strictly liable for the arson, just

9

as Congress could hold defendants like Petitioner

10

strictly liable for the fact that he ends up using an

11

identification that belongs to somebody else.

12

But our point is simply there are reasons

13

why Congress might not do that, including the anomalous

14

kind of penalties that end up being meted out here,

15

where you have people -- two people with identical

16

culpability ending up with substantially different

17

punishments, or people with substantially different

18

culpability ending up with identical punishments.

19

If you have the classic aggravated identity

20

thief who breaks into a bank account using a means of

21

identification he knows belongs to somebody else, it's

22

exactly the same sentence, under the government's view,

23

as somebody like Petitioner who just unknowingly used a

24

number in order to get a job.

25

Now, it's not impossible that Congress could
25
Alderson Reporting Company

Official - Subject to Final Review

1

make that policy choice, but when it does, it tends to

2

write statutes that look very different than this.

3

writes ones that look like the quantity statute that I

4

just cited or the school zone statute.

5

JUSTICE KENNEDY:

It's not a clear statute.

6

What -- what if the accused knowingly uses a card -

7

identity belonging to a dead person?

8

person?

9

MR. RUSSELL:

It

Is that a real

I think that's an open

10

question in the circuits.

Some circuits have said that

11

it has to be a means of identification belonging to a

12

living person, but that's -- that's not settled.

13

JUSTICE KENNEDY:

14

MR. RUSSELL:

What is your view?

My view -- I mean, the statute

15

says "of another person."

16

presume that to mean a live person.

17

guess, it really doesn't matter to the outcome of my

18

case.

19

I think you would ordinarily

JUSTICE STEVENS:

But ultimately, I

Well, it does, though, in

20

a way, because I understand your theory is there are two

21

basic kinds of crimes.

22

your own source if you want to get the job or you want

23

entry into the country or something like that.

24

minor crime.

25

where you are pretending to be somebody else so you can

You just use the document for

That's a

But if you are -- it's identity theft

26
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1

get advantage of his credit and his assets and his

2

access to computers.

3
4
5

That's a much more serious crime.

Now, if it's a dead person, it seems to me
to be in the former category, rather than in the latter.
MR. RUSSELL:

That's true.

Certainly, using

6

the identification of a dead person doesn't impose the

7

kind of harms on real victims that Congress seemed to be

8

most focused on in this case.

9

interpretation of the statute we don't think unduly

10

interferes with that protective function, precisely

11

because the government ought to, in a great many cases,

12

very easily show that the way that the person used the

13

means of identification shows that they knew that it

14

belonged to somebody else.

15

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

And certainly, our

This -- this conduct

16

would amount to identity -- what did it say -- is there

17

a crime of identity fraud?

18

MR. RUSSELL:

Well, that's what we have been

19

using to refer to the underlying predicate offense here,

20

which is the misuse of the immigration document.

21

that's -- that applies whenever somebody uses an

22

immigration document -- and there is another statute for

23

Social Security cards -- that doesn't belong to them.

24

And the government only has to prove that they knew that

25

it didn't belong them.

And that in itself is a
27
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1

substantial protection for people who might be unknowing

2

victims or victims of somebody like my client.

3

substantially deterred from risking their credit by the

4

mere fact that he is going to face a substantial penalty

5

for using the false document in and of itself.

6

client's -

7

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

He is

My

It would be equally false

8

if the Social Security number were fictitious -- it

9

didn't belong to -

10
11

MR. RUSSELL:

Didn't belong to anybody.

That's correct.

12

If I could reserve the remainder of my time.

13

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:

14

Thank you, Mr.

Russell.

15

Mr. Heytens.

16

ORAL ARGUMENT OF TOBY J. HEYTENS

17

ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

18
19
20

MR. HEYTENS:

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it

please the Court:
It is common ground that there are at least

21

three preconditions to liability under 18 U.S.C. section

22

1028A(a)(1):

23

commit one of the separate predicate felonies that are

24

specifically enumerated in subsection (c).

25

during the commission of that felony, the defendant must

First and foremost, the defendant must

28
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use something that is in fact a means of identification

2

of another person.

3

identification of another person must itself be without

4

lawful authority and must have the effect of

5

facilitating the defendant's commission of the

6

underlying predicate felony.

7

And, third, that use of the means of

The question in this case is whether the

8

government must also show that the defendant was

9

specifically aware that the means of identification that

10

he uses to facilitate his underlying crime was that of

11

another person.

12

And the answer to that question is no.

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

Mr. Heytens, did the

13

prosecutor give the right answer to Judge Friedman in

14

the district court when Judge Friedman asked:

15

take two people and one of them gets a false Social

16

Security card and it happens that the number belongs to

17

no live person, and another person goes to the same

18

outfit, but the card that he gets does belong to a live

19

person -- he doesn't know in either case -- did the

20

prosecutor give the right answer when he said, when it

21

turns out to be a fictitious number, no two-year add-on;

22

but if it turns out to be a real number, two years'

23

mandatory addition?

24

the difference.

25

Where I

The prosecutor said, yes, that's

Was that the right answer?

MR. HEYTENS:

Yes, it was.
29
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1

explain, the first -- the reason that the first

2

defendant is not guilty, is that it is an absolute

3

precondition for liability under this statute that the

4

means of identification in question be that of another

5

person.

6

So there are no victimless violations of

7

1028(a)(1), because if we are having this conversation

8

at all, there was a real victim involved in the case.

9

The reason the second individual is -

10

JUSTICE ALITO:

If I could just interrupt

11

you, why does "of another individual" -- why can't that

12

be read to mean "of a person other than the person who

13

is using the identification," whether this other person

14

is real or not?

15

MR. HEYTENS:

Justice Alito, I think the

16

answer to that relates to the definition of "means of

17

identification," which is reproduced in the appendix to

18

our brief -- I believe at 4a.

19

1028(d)(7).

20

means "any name or number that may be used, alone or in

21

conjunction, to identify a specific individual."

22

understand that, especially in conjunction with the

23

words "of another person," to require, at least under

24

1028A(a)(1), that we have to be talking about a real

25

individual.

That's 18 U.S.C.

The definition of "means of identification"

30
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JUSTICE STEVENS:

Mr. Heytens, this raises

2

the question I was talking to your opponent about.

3

you think that Congress intended there to be a more

4

severe punishment for somebody who really steals another

5

person's -- knowingly steals somebody else's identity so

6

he can cash in on his credit and so forth?

7

me, arguably, that's the important difference.

8
9

MR. HEYTENS:

Do

It seems to

Justice Stevens, I agree that

a person who deliberately sets out to misappropriate the

10

identity of a known individual is almost certainly more

11

culpable than someone who does not do it but

12

inadvertently does so.

13

But I don't think that is controlling in

14

this case for a very important reason, and the very

15

important reason -- again, to go back to what I said at

16

the outset -- is we are not having this conversation

17

unless the defendant has already committed a predicate

18

felony, and he is subject to punishment for that

19

predicate felony.

20

predicate felony subjected Mr. Flores-Figueroa to a term

21

of up to 10 years of imprisonment, above and beyond the

22

2 years.

23

For example, in this case, the

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:

Yes, but I think --

24

I thought that argument cut against you, because what

25

you are saying is everybody is on the hook.
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basic problem here, which is -- I'll call "identity

2

fraud" -- and yet you get an extra two years if it just

3

so happens that the number you picked out of the air

4

belongs to somebody else.

5

MR. HEYTENS:

I understand how, from the

6

defendant's perspective -- to use the Justice -- the

7

example that Justice Ginsburg used as well, but it may

8

seem from the defendant's perspective that he just so

9

happened to take a real person's number.

But I think

10

the critical fact here is that it's not seen that way

11

from the perspective of the real individual whose number

12

he ended up using.

13

important fact.

14

And I think that's the critically

JUSTICE BREYER:

Why?

Because that's what

15

we normally bring into sentencing.

16

that we don't impose mandatory -- we impose mandatory

17

sentences when the person does something, you know,

18

that's wrong and he knows it's wrong.

19

I mean, normally, in

When -- when harm occurs, and the harm

20

wasn't known or intended, you can take care of it if you

21

are a judge.

You increase the sentence.

22

MR. HEYTENS:

23

JUSTICE BREYER:

24

MR. HEYTENS:

25

Well, Justice What's the problem?

Justice Breyer, my answer to

your question will probably be only of interest to those
32
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members of the Court who find legislative history

2

probative, but I think for those who do, the very

3

significant answer to that is that the one thing the

4

legislative history makes very clear is that at least

5

some members of Congress believed that judicially

6

discretionary sentences before this statute were enacted

7

were failing to adequately take into account the harm

8

suffered by real victims.

9

There's very clear legislative history to

10

that effect.

11

the judge to take into account the impact of -

12

The statement that just leaving it up to

JUSTICE STEVENS:

Does the legislative

13

history deal with people who are stealing identities of

14

people who have been -- or bilking identities?

15

that legislative history cuts the other way.

16

MR. HEYTENS:

I think

I certainly agree, Justice

17

Stevens.

18

lists nine specific cases in which Congress -- or some

19

members of Congress with the people authored the

20

report -- made the judgment that people who had engage

21

in the sort of conduct that Congress wanted to reach had

22

received short sentences under the previous regime.

23

There are nine specific examples given in the House

24

report.

25

There's a portion of the House report that

I acknowledge freely that eight of those
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nine examples very clearly, by the description, involve

2

individuals who must have known that they were using -

3

JUSTICE BREYER:

Why not just says "means of

4

identification," then?

5

statute that has elements and you put the word

6

"knowingly," and the "knowingly" is supposed to modify

7

some elements but not others.

8

statutes that do that.

9

I mean, it's odd to write a

I can't think of other

There may be some.

It's pretty peculiar.

You could have left

10

off the last element.

11

criminal statute, anyone would know that.

12

I mean, if you are drafting a

MR. HEYTENS:

There are two responses to

13

that, Justice Breyer.

14

written in some statutes that clearly presuppose that

15

"knowingly" doesn't go all the way through, because they

16

repeat the knowingly requirement in those statutes.

17

First of all, Congress has

For example -- and it's the appendix to the

18

reply, appendix G, at page 23a of the appendix to the

19

reply brief, that reproduces 18 U.S.C. 922(q)(2)(A),

20

which is a statute that repeats a knowingly requirement

21

in the text of the statute, which under Petitioner's

22

argument doesn't make any sense at all, because you

23

would just construe "knowingly" -

24
25

JUSTICE BREYER:

Give me one where what

they've done is they have used "knowingly" at the
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beginning, and there are four elements of the crime, and

2

-- I'm not saying there are none, but I'd like to know

3

what they are where "knowingly" doesn't modify something

4

there is strict liability for.

5

MR. HEYTENS:

Sure.

6

JUSTICE BREYER:

I'll give you two -

That's going to be

7

jurisdictional -- probably jurisdictional hooks, like

8

Hobbs Act, and there could be -- there could be some.

9

But I don't see -- you tell me.

10

MR. HEYTENS:

I'll give you two.

There's

11

the statute that's at issue before this Court in

12

Morissette v. United States, and there's the statute

13

that was construed by the D.C. Circuit in an opinion by

14

Justice Ginsburg, in United States v. Chin.

15

The statute at issue in Morissette says,

16

"knowingly converts to his use anything of value of the

17

United States."

18

defendant had to have knowledge of the facts sufficient

19

to make his conduct a conversion.

20

the property has an owner, that it's not abandoned, and

21

he has to know that the owner is not him.

22

In Morissette, this Court held the

He has to know that

But the lower courts have uniformly held

23

that, under that statute, the defendant does not need to

24

know that the property in question belongs to the United

25

States.
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Or take the Chin statute.

The Chin statute

2

says "knowingly and intentionally" uses, hires, or

3

employs a person under the age of 18 to avoid detection

4

of a drug trafficking crime.

5

In Chin, the D.C. Circuit said -- and every

6

other court of appeals to have considered the question

7

has said -- the defendant does not need to be

8

specifically aware that the individual in question is

9

less than 18 years old.

10

JUSTICE STEVENS:

But the reason for that is

11

it's an equally culpable act where you steal something

12

off of a field as in Morissette.

13

case supports you, even though they relied on it, which

14

is interesting to me.

15

distinguishing between two equally culpable acts.

16

doesn't even make any difference whether he knows the

17

owner was some private farmer or the United States.

18

In this case, you've got two really big

19

categories of different crimes, and to say they are

20

treated alike is the thing that troubles me here.

21

I agree the Morissette

But that's a -- you are

MR. HEYTENS:

It

Justice Stevens, I agree that

22

Mr. Morissette's culpability, or the hypothetical

23

defendant in standpoint of Mr. Morissette, doesn't

24

really depend on whether he knows the property belongs

25

to the Federal Government or he thinks he is stealing
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from his neighbor.

2

He is a bad person either way.

I don't think that's true of the Chin

3

statute, though.

I think we make a very strong argument

4

that someone who deliberately employs someone that he

5

has -

6

JUSTICE BREYER:

7

JUSTICE STEVENS:

8

MR. HEYTENS:

9

You can do it That's the point.

Sure.

Under this statute, I

think the significance is, first and foremost, we are

10

not having this discussion unless he has already

11

committed an underlying predicate felony.

12

JUSTICE BREYER:

Even that isn't -- I mean,

13

here you're treating it as if it is a separate thing.

14

That's fair enough.

15

person" doing there if really they are not supposed to

16

make any difference in terms of mental state?

17

And what are the words "of another

MR. HEYTENS:

What they are doing there

18

is -- this goes back to my point that this is a

19

victim-focused statute.

20

say, this statute does not apply unless the name or

21

number in question is actually that of a specific

22

individual.

23

What they are doing there is to

Take the JUSTICE SOUTER:

I can -- I can understand

24

your argument if you're saying, look, you can't tell

25

simply from the text what the answer is.
37
Alderson Reporting Company

You can only

Official - Subject to Final Review

1

tell the answer if you say -- know what the answer is if

2

you say Congress had victims in mind, and if we are

3

going to worry about victims, we are not going to worry

4

about -- we are going to take a narrow, rather than a

5

broad, view of "knowingly."

6

Is that your position?

Do you agree that if

7

you simply look at the text of this statute without

8

considering congressional policy, you don't win?

9

MR. HEYTENS:

We don't concede that the text

10

of the statute alone unambiguously resolves the issue in

11

our favor -

12

JUSTICE SOUTER:

Well, but does it -- does

13

it even come close to supporting it?

14

start out with your analogous position.

15

position is that the "knowingly" simply refers to the -

16

the -- the three acts which are specified by which the

17

identification can -- can be -- the misidentification

18

can be perpetrated.

19

I mean, let's
Your analogous

Transfers, possesses, or uses.

Could

20

Congress possibly have said, gee, he might not know that

21

he was acting to transfer or to possess or to us?

22

That's not a serious possibility.

23

to refer to something more than the three possible acts.

24
25

So, "knowingly" has

And once you get beyond the three possible
acts, and you say, well, we're going to draw the line
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between "without authority" and "another person" -- that

2

seems like an arbitrary line.

3

the line seems even more obvious when the "without

4

lawful authority" is set off as a parenthetical.

5

the real object of the statute -- the real -- the

6

operative description is "a means of identification of

7

another person."

8
9

And the arbitrariness of

And

That's why, it seems to me that, if you look
at the text, you could say, well, of course, the

10

"knowingly" has got to refer to everything that follows,

11

both "lawful authority" and "another person."

12

And that's why, it seems to me, if you're

13

going to win, you've got to win on the grounds that

14

Congress wouldn't have meant what seems so natural,

15

because Congress wanted to help victims, not defendants.

16
17

Where am I going wrong there, if I'm going
wrong?

18

MR. HEYTENS:

Justice Souter, I -- I think,

19

as I said before, we do not contend that this statutory

20

text standing along ambiguously supports our position

21

and thus terminates the inquiry.

22

that the purpose is an important part of our argument.

23

And I certainly agree

I think there are two important things

24

to just unpack briefly -- two of the things you said

25

there.

Once you extend "knowingly" to -- I think the
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1

significance is with the effect of once you extend

2

"knowingly," first to "lawful authority" and then to the

3

"use of identification."

4

lawful authority," any conceivable argument that the

5

other side can have about criminalizing innocent or

6

inadvertent conduct disappears, because then at that

7

point the defendant knows specifically that he is acting

8

in manner that is contrary to law.

9

And then, second, if -

Once you extend it to "without

10

JUSTICE SOUTER:

11

MR. HEYTENS:

12

JUSTICE SOUTER:

But Is it worth two years?

I think -- I think it is.
The only thing that we know

13

for sure is that Congress said it's not worth two years'

14

extra unless that of another person was involved.

15

if that is what is so significant or necessarily

16

significant in getting a two-year add-on, then it seems

17

reasonable to suppose that Congress thought that the

18

state of mind had to touch that.

19

MR. HEYTENS:

And

Well, I think, first of all,

20

at that point the defendant already has two different

21

culpable states of mind:

22

mind to commit the underlying felony, and he has the

23

culpable state of mind with regard to his crime.

24
25

He has the culpable state of

Now, I agree with you, Justice Souter,
there's arguments you can make both ways as a matter of
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policy.

I think, though, some of the colloquies with my

2

colleague on the other side illustrate why Congress

3

would have made the decision it did, and it's all of

4

those cases where the defendant is reckless, where the

5

defendant is willfully ignorant, or the defendant simply

6

doesn't know because he -

7
8

JUSTICE SOUTER:
is to say "recklessly."

9
10

All Congress has got to do

MR. HEYTENS:

It's certainly true that

Congress -

11

JUSTICE SOUTER:

It's an -- it's an accepted

12

term.

13

means.

14

All they have to do is put the word "recklessly" in

15

there.

16

wouldn't omit anything that is covered by this, and it

17

would solve precisely that problem.

18

it.

19

Every -- well, almost everybody knows what it
There's a model Penal Code standard, and so on.

It would cover every "knowingly" case.

MR. HEYTENS:

It

And they didn't do

I certainly agree there are

20

other ways that Congress could have written the statute

21

to make it clear.

22

written the statute in a way that would be more clear,

23

both that would resolve the case in favor of Petitioner

24

and that would resolve the case in favor of us.

25

don't know how that cuts either way.

But I think it -- they could have
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1

JUSTICE SCALIA:

Well, I'll tell you what

2

cuts one way or another.

3

well, not surprising because I've heard -- I've heard

4

the government do it before.

5

is an ambiguous statute.

6

-- it could mean the one thing or the other.

7

I -- I find it -- I find it,

You acknowledge that this

That -- that on its face, it

I would normally conclude from that that we

8

apply the rule of lenity.

Since it could go either way,

9

let's assume that the defendant gets the -- you know,

10

the tie goes to the defendant.

11

resolve it that way?

12

MR. HEYTENS:

Why -- why shouldn't I

Well, under the rule of

13

lenity, Justice Scalia, the tie does go to the

14

defendant.

15

again, including in its opinion in Hayes yesterday, the

16

fact that the statutory text has a certain amount of

17

ambiguity isn't "off to the races" we trigger the rule

18

of lenity.

19
20

But, as the Court has made clear again and

The rule of lenity CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:

Should -- should it

-- is it time to revisit the Court's decision in Hayes?

21

(Laughter.)

22

MR. HEYTENS:

The Court -- what the Court

23

said yesterday in Hayes is precisely what it had said

24

before in Muscarello.

25

play at the end of the process of statutory

The rule of lenity comes into
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1

interpretation, after you consider text, purpose,

2

legislative history, and all other -

3

JUSTICE BREYER:

All that is true, and

4

that's actually where I was going.

It -- it seems to me

5

where the ambiguity is precisely is that none of us

6

doubts, I don't think, that what Congress is after with

7

this extra two-year mandatory is identity theft.

8

And where the argument lies is between, did

9

Congress do this by punishing people only who intend to

10

engage in identity theft or people who, while not

11

intending to do so, have that effect?

12

MR. HEYTENS:

13

JUSTICE BREYER:

That's the issue.

I think that is the effect.
And I don't think I can

14

resolve that one way or the other from anything you have

15

said.

16

I use the rule of lenity this way, which I am trying

17

out, I'm not buying it:

18

mandatory-minimum sentences, there is a particularly

19

strong argument for a rule of lenity with bite.

20

that is because mandatory minimums, given the human

21

condition, inevitably throw some people into the box who

22

shouldn't be there.

23

and we put him outside, the judge could give him the

24

same sentence anyway.

25

It's rather hard to say.

So, therefore, suppose

In the case of

And

And if this person should be there

So the harm by mistakenly throwing a person
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1

outside the box through the rule of lenity to the

2

government is small.

3

wrongly throwing him into the box is great.

4

lenity is, therefore, limited to a very small subset of

5

cases where it has particular force, but this is one of

6

them.

7

The harm to the individual by

MR. HEYTENS:

The rule of

Justice Breyer, I -- I guess

8

what I would say first and foremost is I -- I think that

9

would be a fairly significant reconceptualization of the

10

purpose of the rule of lenity -

11

JUSTICE BREYER:

12

MR. HEYTENS:

13

JUSTICE SCALIA:

The Court -- if I

You'd have to rename it the

rule of, you know, who gets hurt the most or something.

16
17

Right.

could just explain why I think that -

14
15

That's why I raised it.

MR. HEYTENS:

The rule of mandatory minimums

--

18

JUSTICE SCALIA:

19

MR. HEYTENS:

Not lenity.

The Court has said over and

20

over again that the two purposes of the rule of lenity

21

are providing fair warning to people before their

22

conduct subjects them to criminal punishment and to

23

demonstrate a proper respect for the lawmaking powers of

24

Congress.

25

a mandatory minimum triggers either one of those

I don't think the fact that a statute imposes
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1

concerns in and of itself.

2

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

But what about the -- the

3

even division -- I think it's an even division, 3/3 -

4

is it a 3/3 split?

5

that this statute is indeed grievously ambiguous, is

6

that that good minds have reached opposite conclusions

7

with well-reasoned decisions on both sides.

8

to me that this is a very strong argument that this is

9

an ambiguous statute, unusually so.

10

And if you wanted one indication

So it seems

And I factor into that the answer that was

11

given to Judge Friedman's question, which astonished me

12

the first time I read it:

13

yes, the same -- no different degree of culpability.

14

One happened to get a fictitious number; the other

15

happened to get a real number.

16

one.

17

of -- of the two defendants.

18

think the -- the ambiguity argument is strong.

19

the world would Congress want to draw such a line?

20

That a prosecutor would say,

Two years for the second

There is no difference at all in the state of mind

MR. HEYTENS:

That's -- that's why I
Why in

Well, again, if I could -

21

there are several things there.

22

the last one, why would Congress want to draw such a

23

line, I think the reason Congress would want to draw

24

such a line is for several reasons.

25

If I could start with

First and foremost is the fundamentally
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victim-focused nature of this statute.

2

that, at least on first blush, that Judge Friedman

3

colloquy does strike a number of people as implausible.

4

And I -- I agree

But I think if you step back, things like

5

that are not uncommon throughout the criminal law.

6

-- the precise same objection could be made to the

7

existence of the felony-murder rule.

8

to engage in precisely the same unlawful course of

9

conduct.

The

Two people go out

Neither one of them wants to kill anybody.

10

Neither one of them wants anyone to get hurt.

11

them the gun goes off, and in one of them the gun

12

doesn't go off.

13

murder, and the other one is guilty of -- of robbery,

14

which is admittedly a serious crime but not as serious

15

of a crime as murder.

16

--

17

In one of

And one of them is now guilty of felony

There are other examples of that

JUSTICE STEVENS:

Yes, but in this

18

particular case, if you talk about identity theft, it's

19

inconceivable that the defendant would not know about

20

fact that there's another person involved.

And so the

21

-- the mens rea issue is easy in this case.

The only

22

time it's -- it's difficult is when he didn't -- when he

23

did not use it for an identity-theft purpose.

24
25

MR. HEYTENS:

Well, I think I -- if I

understand the question correctly, I think there are
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1

certainly many cases in which the manner in which the

2

defendant uses the means of identification will, itself,

3

provide powerful circumstantial evidence that he knows

4

there is, in fact, another person.

5

the actions won't make any sense.

6

JUSTICE STEVENS:

Because otherwise

And those are the category

7

of cases in which Congress wanted to have a more severe

8

penalty.

9

MR. HEYTENS:

I certainly agree that those

10

are at least some of the category of cases.

11

guess I disagree about is that those are the only

12

category of cases.

13

I -- what I

And if I -- if I could try another tack on

14

that, when you -- when you review the House report, the

15

legislative history that talks about the reason, the

16

background and need for the legislation, Congress

17

repeatedly trots out a great many statistics about the

18

number of people who are victimized by identity theft,

19

the amount of dollar harm that is caused to people and

20

businesses by identity theft, and -

21
22
23

JUSTICE STEVENS:

And in any of those cases

did they talk about unknowing identity theft?
MR. HEYTENS:

What I guess I am saying,

24

Justice Stevens, is in none of those cases does Congress

25

-- when it's trotting out those statistics -- does
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1

Congress distinguish between situations in which the

2

victim was able to determine whether the defendant knew

3

that he existed.

I mean -

4

JUSTICE SCALIA:

5

MR. HEYTENS:

6

statute, Justice Scalia.

7
8
9
10
11
12

Is this in the statute?

It is not in the text of the

JUSTICE SCALIA:
Congress, then.

Well, let's not say

Does -- does the Committee?

MR. HEYTENS:

The Committee report, I

apologize, Justice Scalia.

The Committee report -

JUSTICE STEVENS:

You won't convince Justice

Scalia of this, but you might convince me.

13

(Laughter.)

14

MR. HEYTENS:

Fair enough.

What I'm saying

15

is, in the course of talking about the harm suffered by

16

victims, the amount of harm, in the course of talking

17

about the number of people who report that they were

18

victims, there is no distinction made whatsoever based

19

on the distinction Petitioner would like to draw.

20

think there's a very good, practical reason for that.

21

person who discovers that there is a problem with their

22

Social Security number having been misused, for example,

23

by someone, that person is almost certainly not going to

24

be able to figure out whether the person who used their

25

Social Security number knows that they exist or not.
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1

All they know is that problems are now showing up on

2

their credit report.

3

questions from the Social Security Administration about

4

this earned income that they, you know, perhaps haven't

5

paid taxes on, for example.

6

position of the victim is not well positioned to

7

determine how the perpetrator got hold of their

8

identifying information.

9

All they know is they are getting

The person who is in the

If I could go back -

10

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:

Well, but in that

11

case, you tell them, look, the person's got 10 years.

12

Right?

13

up to 10 years for identity fraud.

14

I mean, if they find the guy, he's going to face

MR. HEYTENS:

He's going to face up to

15

10 years, Mr. Chief Justice.

16

important thing.

17

been concerned that the guy is not actually going to get

18

10 years because there was evidence before them that the

19

person was not getting 10 years, that the person was

20

being, at least in the judgment of some people, not

21

receiving sufficient punishment to reflect that, that

22

there was a real person who was harmed by the conduct -

23

that was harmed by the conduct that eventually had an

24

adverse impact on him.

25

I think that's the

I think Congress rationally could have

I think that fundamentally was the
49
Alderson Reporting Company

Official - Subject to Final Review

1

motivating force behind the statute, the need to have a

2

statute that takes adequate and discrete account for the

3

presence of a real victim.

4

Now, the Petitioner, for example, refers to

5

the statement of having met the statute -- excuse me -

6

as having a mandatory minimum.

7

the statute has a mandatory minimum.

8

mandatory, discrete, prescribed punishment.

9

two years up to something else.

10
11

It's not correct to say
This statute has a
It's not

It's two years, and

exactly two years.
And I think that's highly significant.

12

Because I think what it says is that Congress thought

13

there was a discrete measure of punishment that was

14

appropriate to reflect the presence of a real victim.

15

The fact that there is a real victim gets you two years.

16

You get whatever else you get on your underlying felony,

17

which can take into account all sorts of other

18

considerations about your crime, but the fact that there

19

was a discrete victim is an independent harm to that

20

person that should be taken into account in imposing

21

criminal punishment.

22

JUSTICE SCALIA:

You could also say you get

23

two years for knowing that there is a discrete victim.

24

I mean -- I -- you can describe it either way.

25

MR. HEYTENS:

You certainly can.
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1
2

JUSTICE SCALIA:

And it makes sense either

way.

3

MR. HEYTENS:

You certainly can describe it

4

either way, but I think in light of the concern that the

5

harms to real victims are not being adequately taken

6

into account, it doesn't seem to us to make sense to

7

make the presence of that additional punishment turn on

8

whether the defendant is specifically aware that the

9

victim existed, and I think at the end of the -

10

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

You -- you gave earlier

11

the felony murder example of the one who -- the gun goes

12

off, he didn't mean to kill anybody.

13

homicide is -- it's an answer to your argument that this

14

statute is entirely victim-centered, because a person is

15

just as dead if he's the victim of a reckless driver as

16

a premeditated murder, and yet we certainly distinguish

17

the penalties in those cases, no matter that the harm

18

was identical.

19

MR. HEYTENS:

But I thought

We certainly do, Justice

20

Ginsburg, and we don't make the extravagant claim that

21

law doesn't look to relative moral culpability in

22

assigning criminal punishment.

23

argument on the other side that that's all the law ever

24

looks to.

25

I'm responding to the

The law frequently looks to two different
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things:

It looks to relative culpability levels, but it

2

also looks at the existence of harm.

3

continue with the homicide example, if you look at moral

4

culpability, two people who both intentionally attempt

5

to cause the death of another human being without any

6

legal excuse for doing so, from a culpability

7

standpoint, have engaged in precisely the same level of

8

moral wrong, but law treats attempted murder and

9

completed murder extremely differently from one another.

If you want to

10

And that's because in one case, as Justice Ginsburg

11

points out, you have a real victim.

12

dies, there is a discrete level of harm to the victim

13

that is not -- that does not occur when, fortunately,

14

the person who tries to kill someone else fails.

15

When the person

And I think, at the end of the day, that is

16

the most important issue in this case.

17

argument again and again and again, especially in the

18

circuits -- let me go back to Justice Ginsburg's point

19

about the three circuits that have gone either way.

20

You see this

First, as a -- as just a threshold matter,

21

this Court has said repeatedly that the fact that courts

22

have disagreed about the proper interpretation of a

23

statute doesn't suffice to trigger the rule of lenity,

24

because this Court almost never takes a case where there

25

is not a circuit split.

And if you said the existence
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of a circuit split makes the statute ambiguous would

2

mean that the criminal defendant wins every time; and

3

the Court has not said that.

4

But -- but also I think where those courts

5

have fundamentally gone wrong is they have essentially

6

said, this is a crime about theft; theft requires you to

7

know that there's a real owner; if you don't know

8

there's a real owner, that's not theft.

9

where they went wrong was at the very beginning.

And I think
Where

10

they went wrong at the very beginning is asking the

11

question of whether it would be natural to refer to

12

someone like Petitioner as a thief.

13

We think the more appropriate question, as

14

the district court said in Godin, is whether it would be

15

at all unusual to refer to the two innocent people whose

16

Social Security number and alien registration numbers

17

Petitioner used to facilitate his two underlying

18

felonies were the victims of identity theft.

19

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:

If -

Well, but the

20

problem with that is the statute says "identity theft";

21

it doesn't say anything about victims.

22

MR. HEYTENS:

It certainty does, Mr. Chief

23

Justice, but it says "identity theft"; it says -- not

24

"theft," and I think the question is whether you refer

25

to those people as having had -- if identity theft
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occurred in this case.

2

from the victim's perspective, which is we think the

3

perspective that Congress was looking at it from, the

4

answer to that question is yes.

5

And I think if you look at it

And for that reason we ask that the judgment

6

of the Eighth Circuit be affirmed.

7

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:

8

Four minutes, Mr. Russell.

9
10

Thank you.
Thank you, counsel.

REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF KEVIN K. RUSSELL
ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

11

MR. RUSSELL:

Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

12

I would like to address just a couple of

13

quick questions about the text, and then address a

14

couple of other issues about the purpose.

15

Justice Breyer, you asked if there were

16

examples of other statutes in which knowledge

17

requirements didn't extend to all the elements.

18

government gave two examples.

19

clearly an example with a jurisdictional element.

20

of the circuit courts that say that the knowledge

21

requirement doesn't extend to "of the United States" do

22

so on the grounds that it's because there's a

23

jurisdictional element, and jurisdictional elements

24

don't extend -- don't require mens rea.

25

The

The first, Morissette, is

With respect to the Chin example, I do
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1

acknowledge that there -- there is a decision that this

2

Court hasn't reviewed in which the D.C. Circuit said it

3

doesn't extend to the age of the victim.

4

within a category of special cases where courts have

5

treated the victimization of children differently, in

6

part because it's so difficult and nearly impossible to

7

prove the defendant's knowledge of the age of the

8

victim.

9

That falls

That kind of practical barrier simply

10

doesn't exist here for all the reasons we've discussed

11

earlier about the government's ability to rely on

12

circumstantial evidence to show the defendant's state of

13

mind here.

14
15

JUSTICE GINSBURG:

There aren't too many

15-year-olds who look like they're over 21?

16

MR. RUSSELL:

17

(Laughter.)

18

MR. RUSSELL:

That's right.

That's right.

With respect to

19

the victim-focused nature of this, again, it's true that

20

-- that the criminal law takes into account both

21

defendant culpability and harm to victims, but the

22

ordinary resolution is to reserve punishment in the

23

criminal system for those who intend the harms that they

24

inflict.

25

There are, of course, exceptions like felony
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murder.

As the LaFave treatise points out, that kind of

2

treatment tends to be reserved for serious bodily injury

3

or death kinds of harm.

4

that Congress thought, although identity theft is

5

serious, that this fell within that kind of category of

6

exceptions.

7

where Congress relies on facts not known to the

8

defendant for sentencing enhancement, but as I've

9

mentioned earlier, it tends to write those statutes in a

And there's no reason to think

There are of course these other exceptions

10

way that makes clear that those enhancement factors are

11

separate and apart from the underlying events, and they

12

don't include an express mens rea requirement there.

13

And the government hasn't cited any case, any statute

14

that looks like this, that has been treated as a

15

sentencing enhancement provision.

16

Finally, with respect to the rule of lenity,

17

the government I think has acknowledged that the

18

statutory text is at least ambiguous with respect to

19

whether or not it compels their conclusion.

20

acknowledged that you can make policy arguments both

21

ways about what would be a good idea about how to treat

22

this kind of conduct.

23

view of what the trigger of the rule of lenity is, this

24

is a classic case for it.

25

They've

And I think, regardless of your

If Congress intended the government's
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interpretation, the government is free to go back to

2

Congress, and there's every reason to believe that

3

Congress would be receptive.

4

construing a mandatory sentence or a mandatory minimum,

5

as Justice Breyer was alluding to, is that it does have

6

this particularly harsh effect, and one that is, as a

7

practical matter, hard to undo in the legislative

8

process, which as the Court has recognized, is another

9

function served by the rule of lenity.

The problem with over

10

If the Court has no further questions.

11

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:

12

The case is submitted.

13

(Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., the case in the

14

Thank you, counsel.

above-entitled matter was submitted.)
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